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ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines how different advertising media affect the occurrence and 
nature of brand asset recognition.  Prior research documents that advertising is positively 
associated with firm sales and brand value.  However, this latter research focuses on 
aggregate advertising expenditures, which ignores a major trend in recent years wherein 
advertising expenditures have shifted from traditional channels (such as TV and 
newspaper) to digital advertising (primarily paid search and online display).  Using 
proprietary data, I exploit this trend and decompose advertising expenditures into three 
core component elements—traditional, online display, and paid search—to examine how 
key advertising media affect subsequent brand asset recognition arising in the context of 
acquisitions.  Consistent with expectations, I find that subsequent to acquisition, target 
firms’ traditional and online display advertising exhibit a higher likelihood of brand asset 
recognition, higher recognized brand asset values, and longer amortization schedules, as 
compared to paid search advertising.  I also document higher deal premiums for targets, 
which spend more on traditional advertising.  Affirming the acquirer’s recognition of a 
brand asset, additional results reveal that investors react positively to the initially 
recognized brand amount, and that those brand intangible assets are positively associated 
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with acquirer future revenue.  Overall, these results confirm expected heterogeneous 
effects of different advertising channels on the recognition and characteristics of the 
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DIGITAL VERSUS TRADITIONAL ADVERTISING AND 
THE RECOGNITION OF BRAND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The past decade has witnessed a rapid and sustained rise in new advertising 
channels—collectively referred to as “digital advertising.”  The Interactive Advertising 
Bureau (IAB) indicates that digital advertising recently surpassed television to become 
the largest advertising channel, exceeding $100 billion in aggregate for 2018 in the US 
(IAB 2018).  Despite the dramatic rise of this new media, accounting research does not 
examine how the various media channels affect either firms’ reporting decisions or 
economic outcomes; this is likely because typical data sources (such as Compustat) do 
not disaggregate advertising expenditures into its various channels.  In this paper, I use an 
alternative dataset that provides this decomposition, and examine how different 
advertising media create long-term value as reflected in managers’ reporting decisions for 
a key advertising asset: brands.  
 I address this research question in the setting of mergers and acquisitions 
(hereafter “M&A”).  Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805 requires that acquirer 
firms recognize intangible assets of the target, including brand assets, separately on the 
balance sheet during M&A.  Subsequent to recognition, the fair value and amortization 
schedule of the brand asset also must be disclosed.  Consistent with marketing theory, I 
assume that a primary economic input that builds the target firm’s brand asset includes 
the firm’s previous advertising expenditures.  As any target firm’s brand asset must be 
recognized following the M&A as part of the purchase price allocation, this setting 
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allows me to directly test manager’s perceptions of value creation by alternative 
advertising channels, as reflected in their reporting decisions regarding the recognition of 
brand intangible assets after the M&A is completed. 
 Prior marketing research suggests that different types of advertising have varying 
effects on firm performance (e.g., Bayer et al. 2019).  These advertising channels are 
divided into three broad categories: paid search, online display, and traditional.   Paid 
search is a type of digital advertising initiated by users: users search for a keyword on a 
search engine (e.g., Google, Bing, or Baidu) and obtain relevant ads appearing as 
sponsored links.  This advertising possesses a high target ability (Goldfarb and Tucker 
2011) and has been shown to deliver strong contemporaneous sales impact (Bayer et al. 
2019), thus appearing more short-term in nature.  Online display represents a second type 
of digital advertising; it comprises online banner, plain text ads, rich media ads, and 
online video ads.  While sharing some characteristics of paid search—such as the ability 
to track and store consumer data—it is a “push’ form of advertising, which is initiated by 
firms with an intent of building brand awareness (Sundar and Kim 2005).  Traditional 
advertising reflects all offline advertising outlets including television, magazine, 
newspaper, radio, and outdoor.  Similar to online display, traditional advertising is 
initiated by firms to create positive brand associations to a wider customer audience.   
Prior research suggests that both traditional and online display have long-term effects that 
include reputation-building, such as enhanced pricing premium and/or long-term 
customer retention (Draganska et al. 2013).  That is, both appear to more strongly map 
into the notion inherent in the long-term asset of a brand, which the FASB defines as the 
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ability to “distinguish from the products of others” (ASC 805).  In contrast, paid search 
appears most strongly associated with immediate sales impact.  Thus—consistent with 
both marketing theory regarding the characteristics of these media channels, and with the 
FASB conceptual notion of a brand asset—I predict that the recognition, value, and 
useful life of a brand asset will have a higher association with traditional and online 
display expenditures relative to those for paid search, and that managers will pay a higher 
premium for traditional and online display.  I validate these predictions in the context of 
M&A, which is one of the only settings to directly observe recognized brand assets 
acquired from target firms, as well as the purchase price by acquirer firms. 
 To obtain the decomposition of advertising expenditures into the three major 
types (paid search, online display, and traditional), I use a proprietary dataset by Kantar 
of annual advertising activities in multiple media channels over a six-year period (2010-
2016).  Kantar is an industry leading media-tracking company, which provides firms’ 
advertising spending on major media outlets through systematic monitoring of firms’ 
advertising activities.  Consistent with expectations, results confirm that both traditional 
and online display advertising of target firms exhibit a higher association with the 
recognition of brand assets relative to paid search.  In addition, I find relatively higher 
recognized brand asset values and longer amortization schedules for traditional and 
online display advertising, as determined by the acquirer firms through their purchase 
price allocations.  I also document that the premium paid by acquirer firms is relatively 
higher for traditional advertising.  Finally, I confirm that investors react positively to the 
amount of brand assets, and that the brand intangible assets generate multiple periods of 
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benefits as reflected in future revenues for the acquirer firms.  Both of the latter results 
provide preliminary support that the acquirer’s recognition of the brand reflects an 
underlying economic asset.  The main results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests 
using alternative variable measurements and controlling for target selection bias, brand 
recognition bias, and advertising endogeneity. 
 This study makes three contributions.  First, there is a long-standing debate 
regarding the long-term effects, and thus appropriate reporting, of advertising 
expenditures.  Under extant US and international standards, most advertising 
expenditures must be expensed as incurred.  Prior studies generally use the aggregated 
advertising expense with an implicit assumption that the aggregate effects can be 
attributed to each of the components equally (e.g., Fee et al. 2008; Lou 2014; Chenmanur 
and Yan 2019).  This paper provides new evidence on the differential effects of 
advertising channels on brand recognition, valuation and purchase premium.  Second, 
despite the enormous shift in advertising expenditures away from traditional to digital 
advertising in recent years, empirical evidence comparing the effects of these different 
channels is scarce.  The few related studies focus on marketing outcomes such as 
customer retention rate, click-through rate, and brand awareness (e.g., Danaher and 
Dagger 2013; Dinner et al. 2013).  This paper builds on these studies by examining brand 
recognition as the outcome variable; this links the heterogeneous effects of alternative 
advertising media to observed reporting outcomes, and thus bridges the marketing and 
accounting research domains.  Third, my study contributes to the literature on intangible 
assets during mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Wyatt 2005; Zhang and Zhang 2017).  As 
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M&A has increased in recent years, the recognition and valuation of the related 
intangible assets has become of greater interest.  Prior studies document both the 
economic drivers and managerial incentives associated with brand asset recognition (e.g., 
Muller 1999; Wyatt 2005).  This paper adds to this literature by documenting that 
different types of advertising play varying roles in determining brand asset and valuation. 
Section 2 surveys the literature on advertising and value relevance, digital versus 
traditional advertising, and intangible asset during mergers and acquisitions.  Section 3 
describes the research design.  Section 4 presents the sample selection process and 
descriptive statistics.  Section 5 provides the primary empirical results, with Section 6 
showing sensitivity and additional analysis.  Section 7 concludes.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1  Prior Literature 
 This paper builds upon three literatures: accounting research linking advertising 
expenditures to market outcomes; recent marketing research examining differences 
between digital and traditional advertising; and prior research on the reporting of mergers 
and acquisitions and related intangible asset recognition.   
 Prior research in accounting examines advertising, principally in the context of 
how such expenditures relate to market variables such as equity price.  Motivating much 
of this research is the debate regarding the appropriate accounting treatment of 
advertising expenditures, with current US GAAP (as well as extant international 
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reporting standards) generally requiring that such expenditures be expensed as incurred.1   
Earlier research supports this argument, documenting that advertising fails to generate 
benefits beyond one period (Bublitz and Ettredge 1989); though some research provides 
contrasting evidence of advertising having multi-period benefits (Hirschey and Weygandt 
1985).  While advertising costs are expensed under US GAAP, brand assets can be 
recognized by acquirer firms in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  This 
creates an inconsistency in the accounting treatment of internally-generated versus 
externally-acquired brand assets, which raises a number of empirical questions (Hunter et 
al. 2012).  Kallapur and Kwan (2004) investigates the relevance and reliability of 
recognized brand assets using M&A in the United Kingdom, and finds that recognized 
brand value is positively associated with acquirer market value of equity, but that this 
association is attenuated for firms with high contracting incentives.   
 A number of studies document an overall effect of advertising as increasing firm 
sales and brand awareness (Meenaghan 1995; Barth et al. 1998).  Motivated by the recent 
evolution of advertising expenditures towards digital advertising channels, more recent 
marketing research compares the impacts of different advertising channels—often 
disaggregating advertising into the broad categories of traditional, online display, and 
paid search.  Traditional advertising expenditures (such as television, radio, and print 
media) are perceived as primarily aimed at brand building, the effectiveness of which is 
                                                        
1  ASC 720 requires the cost of advertising (except for direct-response advertising) to be 
expensed as incurred, or at the first time the advertising takes place.  Similarly, IAS 38R under 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) also requires expenditure on advertising 
and promotional activities to be expensed when incurred. 
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measured by brand awareness and consumer preferences (Dragan et al. 2013; De Vries et 
al. 2017).  Digital channels are broadly categorized into online display and paid search.  
Online display advertising (such as banner ads) reflect some similar characteristics to 
traditional advertising, in that online display also generates brand interest (Dragan et al. 
2013), increases brand search queries (Danaher and Mullarkey 2003), helps with 
customer retention (Manchanda et al. 2006), and is associated with firm sales (Bayer et 
al. 2019).  In contrast, paid search (such as Google searches) is associated with a higher 
click-through rate, and translates more directly to sales than online display (Ghose and 
Yang 2009; Rutz et al. 2011).  Studies comparing the effectiveness of different 
advertising channels document that both traditional and digital advertising contribute to 
firm performance (Sridhar et al. 2016), yet paid search is superior to traditional in 
increasing short-term firm sales (Bayer et al. 2019), and online display performs as well 
as with TV on the longer-term dimension of building brand awareness (Dragan et al. 
2013). 
 Finally, prior research examines the reporting effects of M&A accounting.  Under 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805, during M&As acquirers must recognize 
separately from goodwill the identifiable intangible assets—including brand—acquired 
from the target.  The two primary requirements to recognize a separate brand asset are: (i) 
the asset must lack physical substance, and be expected to generate future economic 
benefits; and (ii) the asset arises either from contractual or other legal rights, or is 
separable (FASB 2007).  Brand assets are recognized apart from goodwill under either (i) 
contractual criteria if trademarks/internet domain names are registered with governmental 
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agencies; or (ii) separable criteria, which FASB believes normally would be the case 
(FASB 2007).  Further, SFAS 141 requires the intangible assets to be recognized at fair 
value.2  Prior literature documents the role of management incentives and measurement 
errors in intangible asset recognition during M&A.  Jones (2011) documents that firms 
with higher bankruptcy and default risk capitalize intangible assets more aggressively.  
McInnis and Monsen (2017) documents that M&As with lower measurement uncertainty 
(proxied by larger acquirer, lower stock return volatility, and experienced acquirer) gain 
higher post-M&A operating income.  However, Wyatt (2005) argues that while 
managerial incentives exist, the underlying economics of firms drive the first order 
recognition of intangible assets.  
2.2  Hypothesis Development 
 Firms allocate advertising expenditures over paid search, online display, and 
traditional advertising.  These advertising channels differ in several aspects: one key 
characteristic is the nature of orientation: this arises from the marketing theory that 
advertising reaches consumers in different stages of the purchase decision-making 
process, or the so-called “marketing funnel.” 3  In a typical marketing funnel, there are 
several stages: the top of the funnel is the “awareness” stage, when firms advertise to 
                                                        
2  SFAS 141R requires acquired identifiable net assets of the target to be recognized at fair value 
at acquisition date.  This requirement suggests that standard setters believe that fair value 
measurement of individual identifiable intangible assets is sufficiently reliable to allow 
separate recognition of those intangible assets at acquisition, and that identifiable intangible 
assets valuation is independent from the total amount paid for acquisition in a business 
combination (Halsey and Hopkins 2017).	
3  The marketing funnel (or purchase funnel) is a theoretical model often used in marketing 
literature to describe the customer journey towards the final purchase of a good or service 
(first introduced by St. Elmo Lewis in 1898).	
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increase product/service awareness; the middle of the funnel is customer “consideration” 
(or interest/desire) stage, when firms try to generate interests from consumers through 
advertisements; and the bottom of the funnel is the “decision” (or “action”) stage, when 
the actual purchase occurs.   
 Paid search is a type of digital advertising initiated by users: users search for a 
keyword on a search engine (e.g., Google, Bing, or Baidu) and obtain relevant ads 
appearing as sponsored links (typically on the top and the right side of the organic search 
results).  When users click on the sponsored ad, they are taken to the advertiser’s website.  
This kind of advertising takes place deep in the funnel of consumer purchase journey, 
with high personalization and a close reach to actual purchase.  It also possesses high 
target ability (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011), and enables firms to track and measure the 
effectiveness of their ads (Rutz et al. 2011).  Consistent with these traits, paid search 
advertising has been shown to deliver strong contemporaneous sales impact (Bayer et al. 
2019) and thus appears more short-term in nature. 
 Online display is a second major type of digital advertising; it comprises online 
banner, plain text ads, rich media ads, and online video ads.  As another type of digital 
advertising, online display shares some similar characteristics of paid search, including 
the ability to track and store consumer data.  However, online display is a “push” form of 
advertising: that is, online display is initiated by firms with an intent of building brand 
awareness (Sundar and Kim 2005).  Hence, online display occurs in the early stage of the 
consumer purchase decision process, and tries to ‘cast a wide net.’     
 Traditional advertising reflects all offline advertising outlets: these include 
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television, magazine, newspaper, radio, and outdoor (such as billboards).  Similar to 
online display, traditional advertising is initiated by firms to create positive brand 
associations to a wider customer audience, and usually occurs at the initial stage of the 
consumer purchase funnel.  It typically does not allow for tracking or direct links to 
customer behavior.  Thus, the brand-building process by online display and traditional 
advertising is primarily aimed at influencing the mindset of a customer, who may 
purchase anytime within a reasonably long horizon (Srinivasan et al. 2010).  Therefore, 
online display and traditional advertising are intended to enhance brand value (Dragan et 
al. 2013), and thus appear more long-term oriented.  
 Although advertising of all types could generate immediate sales as well as brand 
value, paid search advertising appears more sales-driven (on average), whereas online 
display and traditional advertising reflect more brand-building investments.  This 
suggests that firms primarily accumulate brand value through expenditures in traditional 
outlets and online display.  When firms possessing such brand value are acquired, the 
accumulated brand can produce ongoing long-term economic benefits for the acquirer 
(which presumably in part motivates the acquisition).4  Accordingly, I expect a 
significant difference between sales driven advertising and brand building advertising as 
follows: 
                                                        
4 In addition, managers are likely to identify individual intangible assets during M&As (versus 
report within the category of goodwill) to both highlight the underlying assets, and potentially 
avoid goodwill impairment losses.  The latter have been documented to be associated with 
manager dismissal (Strong and Meyer 1987).  Further, while brand intangible assets can also 
be impaired, the impairment amount is usually much smaller in magnitude, suggesting lower 
associated risks relative to goodwill.	
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H1  Traditional and online display, as compared with paid search, have a higher 
association with the likelihood of brand asset recognition by acquirers during 
M&A. 
 As tension in this expectation, companies disclose little information on 
advertising expense, possibly due to proprietary costs (Liang 2018).  Some firms provide 
marketing and sales expense, which includes payroll expenditures, while some other 
firms only disclose a total of SG&A expense on 10K filings.  Only a small fraction of 
firms (29% of Compustat firms) provides annual total advertising expenditures with 
limited description.  Therefore, information on advertising expenditures and the 
breakdown of money spent on each media outlet are managers’ private information; and 
the limited breakout of advertising expenditures, coupled with limited disclosure of the 
nature of these expenditures, are consistent with managers viewing this information as 
having proprietary costs.  If similar proprietary costs carry through following the 
acquisition, the acquirer firm may choose not to separate out an intangible brand asset to 
avoid revealing proprietary information.5 
 After intangible asset recognition, the acquirer firm must determine several key 
asset attributes: the value of the brand asset, and its useful life (to determine the amount 
of recurring amortization, if any).  To determine the asset value, the FASB guidelines 
recommend three approaches to valuing intangible assets: market, income, and cost 
                                                        
5  In addition to proprietary costs, prior research questions the effectiveness of building brand 
value from traditional and online display advertising.  Stafford and Faber (2005) argues that 
traditional advertising comes with a cost additional to the media buy: communication is 
homogenous and often appealing to the lowest common denominator. 
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approach.  For brand assets, the most common approach is the income approach, 
specifically the relief from royalty (hereafter “RFR”) method.  The RFR method 
determines an asset value by reference to the hypothetical royalty payments saved 
through owning the asset, as compared with licensing the asset from a third party.  Key 
inputs in RFR method include revenue forecasts associated with the asset, expected 
useful life, royalty rate, and discount rate.  The valuation process is typically finalized 
within 6-12 months of the effective date of the acquisition.  
 Firms investing in traditional advertising and online display should (on average) 
accumulate brand value.  Subsequent to the target firm’s acquisition, any accumulated 
brand value should affect the acquirer’s future performance, including increased firm 
sales (Morgan and Rego 2009), higher market value (Kallapur and Kwan 2004), and 
lower cost of capital (Smith et al. 2010).  This suggests that more traditional and online 
display lead the acquirer firms to estimate a higher future revenue stream associated with 
the brand and a lower discount rate, using the RFR method.  
 Moreover, as advertising expenditures represent management investment 
strategies and are quite sticky (Anderson et al. 2003), firms allocating money in 
traditional and online display are likely those, which consistently invest in brand building 
advertisements.  Such advertisements affect consumers’ expectations of product or 
service quality (Kirmani and Wright 1989), leading to strong brand images and high 
customer loyalty (Yoo et al. 2000).  Thus, a strong brand equity is expected to benefit a 
firm for many years, resulting in a longer expected useful life.  Hence, more traditional 
and online display also are expected to create brand assets with a higher expected useful 
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life, which increases brand intangible value under RFR method.6 
 Collectively, these insights lead to the following two hypotheses: 
H2a  Traditional and online display, as compared with paid search, have a higher 
association with the value of brand asset recognized by acquirers during M&A. 
H2b  Traditional and online display, as compared with paid search, have a higher 
association with the expected useful life of brand asset recognized by acquirers 
during M&A. 
 However, as the intangible asset valuation process requires many assumptions, 
there is considerable opportunity for managerial discretion and manipulation.  For 
example, more opportunistic managers may project a higher revenue generated by the 
brand to derive a higher brand value.  In addition, risk-averse managers may assume a 
higher discount rate, resulting in a lower intangible value.  Finally, managers also face 
incentives to designate the brand as having an indefinite useful life to avoid subsequent 
amortization expense and consequently no impact on earnings, as well as a higher brand 
asset value.  Collectively, if opportunistic managerial discretion causes the value of the 
brand to deviate from its true economic value, I expect to observe no association between 
the examined advertising components and brand value. 
 As previously argued, the limited disclosure by companies surrounding 
                                                        
6  From the external monitor’s perspective, the SEC closely monitors the valuation of intangible 
assets.  Specifically, SEC staff often request that registrants discuss in their 10Ks the valuation 
method and principal assumptions used to determine the fair value of each major class of 
intangible assets acquired (Ernst & Young 2018).  In addition, acquirer firms sometimes hire 
independent external appraisals to help with intangible asset valuation.  Bahadir et al. (2008) 
interviews executives and valuation experts, providing evidence that in the current accounting 
environment (i.e., post-Enron and post SOX), the flexibility of manipulation is very limited 
and firms spend considerable time/resources to get the valuation numbers correct. 
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advertising creates considerable uncertainty regarding the magnitude of future cash flows 
arising from these expenditures.  This uncertainty can generate information asymmetry 
between the acquirer firms, who perform extensive due diligence analyses of the potential 
acquisition target, and the investors.  If advertising expenditures on traditional and online 
display lead to private “brand” benefits for the acquirers, then there would be a higher 
information asymmetry between acquirer firms and the market for those targets spending 
more on traditional and online display.  This, in turn, should lead to a higher premium 
acquirer firms are willing to pay for the target firms.  This leads to my last hypothesis: 
H3  Traditional and online display have a positive association with the premium paid 
by acquirers during M&A. 
 However, investors may acquire firms’ advertising information and price it in 
contemporaneously.  Since the premium paid reflects expected synergies over the target 
firm’s pre-acquisition market value, if investors react contemporaneously to advertising 
(that is, already incorporate this information into the target’s market price), there would 
be no association between premium and advertising expenditures (or even a negative 
association, if managers deem advertising as over-valued by the market). 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1  Advertising Data Source and Sample Collection 
To test the differential impact of traditional, online display, and paid search 
advertising on recognized brand asset value during M&A, I measure advertising using the 
Kantar dataset.  Kantar decomposes a firm’s advertising expenditures into 19 media 
outlets; thus, it is much more granular as compared with the commonly used Compustat 
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advertising data.7  Kantar obtains this information through systematic monitoring of 
firms’ advertising activities across various channels.  It first tracks firms’ advertisement 
occurrences over major media outlets, and then multiplies each advertisement occurrence 
by its related rate provided by advertising agents to get the dollar amount estimate.8  The 
initial Kantar dataset includes advertising expenditures for around 175,000 firms each 
year from 2010 to 2016; most are smaller, private firms.  I match reported parent firm 
names from Kantar to those in Compustat.9  2,589 unique firms are identified as publicly 
traded firms on a US stock exchange.  Using Kantar advertising data spanning 2010-
2016, I thus obtain a breakdown of firm’s advertising expenditures by traditional media 
(e.g., television and radio), online display (e.g., online banner ads), and paid search (e.g., 
Google search).   
To observe the incidence of brand asset recognition and the amount of acquisition 
premium, I use the setting of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), in which acquirer firms 
recognize brand assets as part of the purchase price allocation.  Specifically, I obtain all 
reported M&A in the US from 2011 to 2018 from Bloomberg database;10 I require both 
acquirer and target firms to be publicly-traded to allow the collection of necessary data.  I 
                                                        
7  The 19 media types provided by Kantar include: paid search; internet display; network TV; 
spot TV; cable TV; Spanish language network TV; syndication; magazines; business-to-
business magazines; Sunday magazines; Hispanic magazines; local magazines; national 
newspapers; local newspapers; Hispanic newspapers; network radio; national spot radio; local 
radio; and outdoor activities.  Note that mobile ads and social media ads are not included in 
the dataset used in this analysis (though are available from Kantar). 
8  For more details, please see the Ad$pender manual (Kantar Media, 2011). 
9  The fuzzy matching algorithm in SAS is employed to find the matched Kantar parent firm 
name from Compustat.  Then I manually check to ensure match accuracy.	




then merge these M&As with the above Kantar advertising data, resulting in 264 deals 
with observable target advertising in pre-M&A periods.  For these 264 acquisitions, I 
manually collect the purchase price allocation information from the acquirer’s SEC 
filings (through either the 10K, 10Q, 8K, or S4 on EDGAR), and merge this data with 
necessary information from Compustat and CRSP.  This leads to a final sample of 210 
deal observations.  
 
3.2  Advertising Variables 
The primary independent variables are target firms’ average advertising 
expenditures prior to acquisition, subject to Kantar advertising data availability.  I use the 
average of the deflated advertising over the two years preceding the acquisition.  Use of 
two years builds on the intuition of brand-building as a longer-term investment in 
advertising expenditures, while not requiring too long a time series (and thus significantly 
reducing the sample size).  I use two alternative deflators to account for heterogeneity 
(firm size): target firm sales and target firm total assets, both measured as of the 
beginning of the fiscal year preceding acquisition.11  Using the Kantar data, I aggregate 
the advertising expenditures into the following three components, representing 
independent variables of interest:  
Traditional  = target firm’s average scaled traditional advertising in the two 
years preceding acquisition 
                                                        
11  While the correlations of the variables using the two alternative scalars are very high, using 
each ensures the results are not affected by the choice of sales (which may be 
disproportionately affected by PaidSearch) or assets (which may be disproportionately 
affected by Traditional or OnlineDisplay).   
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OnlineDisplay = target firm’s average scaled online display advertising in the two 
years preceding acquisition  
PaidSearch  = target firm’s average scaled paid search advertising in the two 
years preceding acquisition. 
 
3.3  The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type of Brand Asset Recognition  
To test H1 (whether target firm spending on traditional and online display 
advertising has a higher impact on the recognition of brand assets relative to paid search), 
I use the following logistic model: 
BrandRecognitioni,t+n = α0 + b1Traditionali,t + b2OnlineDisplayi,t + b3PaidSearchi,t + 
b4MAStrategyi,t + b5TargetFirmAgei,t + b6TargetIndGrowthi,t 
+ b7TargetSalesGrowthi,t + b8TargetMktSharei,t + 
b9TargetIndCompetitioni,t +  b10TargetIndDemandRiski,t + 
b11AcqBrandMentioni,t + b12AcqLeveragei,t + 
b13AcqFinancingi,t + b14AcqSizei,t + Industry FE + Year FE + 
ei,t                 (1)  
The dependent variable is BrandRecognition; it is measured as an indicator 
variable equal to one if the acquirer firm recognizes a separate brand intangible asset on 
the final purchase price allocation from acquisition i in year t+n, and zero otherwise.   
The main variables of interest are the three measures of advertising expenditures: 
Traditional, OnlineDisplay, and PaidSearch.  Under H1, if traditional and online display 
advertising have a bigger impact on brand development (and thus recognition of a brand 
upon acquisition), then I predict positive coefficients on Traditional (b1) and 
OnlineDisplay (b2) that are more positive than that on PaidSearch (b3). 
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Following Bahadir et al. (2008), I control for synergy between target and acquirer 
(MAStrategy), target industry sales growth (TargetIndGrowth), target three-year sales 
growth (TargetSalesGrowth), target market share (TargetMktShare), target industry 
concentration level (TargetIndCompetition), and target industry sales volatility 
(TargetIndDemandRisk).  As firms operating in the same industry, having higher industry 
sales growth, higher individual firm growth, larger market share, higher concentration, 
and less industry sales volatility are expected to have higher cash flow expectations from 
the acquired brands, the predicted coefficient signs are positive for all variables.  
Following Muller (1999), I control for firm’s incentives to over- or under-value 
intangible assets by including acquirer’s leverage and financing considerations.  
AcqLeverage is the acquirer’s long-term debt deflated by total assets; the predicted sign is 
positive, as firms with higher leverage have incentives to record intangible assets to 
loosen debt covenant restrictions and thereby increase the firms’ access to new debt 
(Wyatt 2005).  AcqSize is acquirer’s logged total assets; this proxies for size effects 
associated with the recognition of brand assets.  AcqFinancing is defined as the acquirer’s 
short-term debt scaled by total assets; the predicted sign is positive since firms in need of 
short-term capital are more likely to disclose discretionary information to reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and potential capital providers.  I also control 
for the extent to which the acquirer firm appears to emphasize brand, as measured by the 
log of the number of brand related words mentioned in the acquirer 10K prior to the 
M&A announcement (AcqBrandMention).  I also include target firm age, as proxied by 
the number of years the target firm has data in Compustat (TargetFirmAge).  The 
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predicted coefficients for both AcqBrandMention and TargetFirmAge are positive, as 
higher acquirer mentions of brand and a longer existence of the target suggest a higher 
likelihood of brand recognition.  Finally, I include industry (1-digit SIC) and year fixed 
effects to control for differences in brand across industries and any time-series trend in 
intangible asset recognitions. 
 
3.4  The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Brand Asset Valuation and 
Amortization  
Next, I assess two key characteristics of recognized brand assets: the valuation 
amount, and the amortization of the underlying asset.  To control for systematic 
differences that may exist between firms that recognize brand assets versus those that do 
not, I use the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure.  In the first stage, I estimate a probit 
model with an indicator dependent variable equal to one if the acquirer recognizes a 
brand, and zero otherwise.  Following Bahadir et al. (2008), I estimate Equation (2) 
below, computing the Mills lambda ratio and including it in subsequent analysis to 
control for systematic differences between firms with and without brand asset 
recognition.   
BrandRecognitioni,t+n = α0 + b1Traditionali,t + b2OnlineDisplayi,t + b3PaidSearchi,t + 
b4AcqLeveragei,t + b5AcqSizei,t + b6AcqFinancingi,t + 
b7AcqTechnologyi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + ei,t            
(2)  
To test H2a (whether target firm’s traditional and online display have a stronger 




BrandValuei,t+n = α0 + b1Traditionali,t + b2OnlineDisplayi,t + b3PaidSearchi,t + 
b4MAStrategyi,t + b5TargetFirmagei,t + b6TargetIndGrowthi,t + 
b7TargetSalesGrowthi,t + b8TargetMktSharei,t + 
b9TargetIndCompetitioni,t +  b10TargetIndDemandRiski,t + 
b11AcqBrandMentioni,t + b12AcqLeveragei,t + b13AcqFinancingi,t + 
b14AcqSizei,t + b15IMRBrandi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + ei,t        
(3)  
 
The dependent variable is BrandValue, the log of the recognized brand 
intangible asset value, and zero if firm does not recognize a brand asset.  I use a tobit 
model for this estimation since the dependent variable is censored.  That is, in the 
final purchase price allocation, firms either report a positive amount for brand value, 
or no recognition in which case it is treated as a 0 brand value; thus, BrandValue is 
left-censored. 
Following Bahadir et al. (2008), I control for synergy between target and acquirer 
(MAStrategy), target industry sales growth (TargetIndGrowth), target three-year sales 
growth (TargetSalesGrowth), target market share (TargetMktShare), target industry 
concentration level (TargetIndCompetition), and target industry sales volatility 
(TargetIndDemandRisk), as well as for acquirer short-term and long-term financing need 
(AcqFinancing and AcqLeverage), and acquirer total assets (AcqSize).  I also control for 
the extent to which acquirer mentions brand in annual report (AcqBrandMention) and the 
age of target firm (TargetFirmage).  All variables are as defined above, with the same 
predicted signs.  I also include the inverse mills ratio (IMR) derived from Equation (2) to 
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control for potential self-selection.  Finally, I include SIC industry and year fixed effects 
to control for differences in brand across industries and any time-series trend in 
intangible asset recognitions.   
The main variables of interest remain: Traditional, OnlineDisplay, and 
PaidSearch.  Consistent with H2a, if traditional and online display advertising have a 
bigger impact on the amount of brand asset that is recognized upon acquisition, then I 
predict positive coefficients on Traditional (b1) and OnlineDisplay (b2) that are more 
positive than that on PaidSearch (b3).  
Finally, to test H2b (whether target firm’s traditional and online display have a 
stronger association with brand expected useful life as compared with paid search 
advertising), I use the following models: 
Amorti,t+n   = α0 + b1Traditionali,t + b2OnlineDisplayi,t + b3PaidSearchi,t +  
 b4MAStrategyi,t + b5TargetFirmAgei,t + b6TargetIndGrowthi,t + 
b7TargetSalesGrowthi,t + b8TargetMktSharei,t + 
b9TargetIndCompetitioni,t +  b10TargetIndDemandRiski,t + 
b11AcqBrandMentioni,t + b12AcqLeveragei,t + b13AcqFinancingi,t + 
b14AcqSizei,t + b15IMRBrandi,t + Industry FE + Year FE + ei,t                                                                                                                    
(4)  
I measure the dependent variable, Amort, in two ways.  First, AmortIndef is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer firm estimates an indefinite useful life of 
brand asset, and zero if no brand asset is recognized or the asset possesses a definite 
useful life.  To obtain estimates from the probability of indefinite useful life on brand 
asset, I use a logistic regression.  Second, the dependent variable is AmortLife, defined as 
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the number of years of expected useful life for brand intangible asset; this is set equal to 0 
if no recognized brand and equal to 30 if indefinite.12  Since indefinite useful life is 
treated as 30 years and no recognized brand is treated as 0, AmortLife is left- and right-
censored and a tobit model is used.  I include the same control variables (with the same 
predicted signs) as in Equation (3). 
Under H2b, if traditional and online display advertising have a bigger effect on 
future economic benefits and useful life, then I predict positive coefficients on 
Traditional (b1) and OnlineDisplay (b2) that are more positive than that on PaidSearch 
(b3). 
 
3.5  The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Acquisition Premium 
To test H3 (whether target firm spending on traditional and online display 
advertising is positively associated with acquisition premium acquirer firms pay), I use 
the following OLS model: 
Premiumi,t+n   = α0 + b1Traditionali,t + b2OnlineDisplayi,t + b3PaidSearchi,t +  
 b4TargetAcqSizei,t + b5TargetBTMi,t + b6TargetSizei,t + 
b7TargetLevi,t + b8TargetROEi,t + b9CompeteBidi,t + b10MAStrategyi,t 
+ b11StockPmti,t + b12Tenderi,t  + Industry FE + Year FE + ei,t                                          
(5)                   
The dependent variable, Premium, is measured in two ways.  First, Premium_Ann 
is M&A announcement date acquisition premium, deflated by the target firm market 
                                                        
12  Results are robust if I alternatively define indefinite with a value of 50 years. 
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value.  Second, Premium_1Mon is one-month prior to M&A announcement date 
acquisition premium, deflated by target firm market value.   
Following Laamanen (2007), I control for target firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics.  TargetAcqSize is the target total assets divided by acquirer total assets.  A 
low target to acquirer size ratio indicates an acquisition of small target by large acquirer, 
which is likely to generate greater improvement than a combination of similar size firms, 
resulting in a high premium (Bhagat et al. 2005).  TargetBTM is the target firm book to 
market ratio: a low book to market ratio suggests that investors already incorporate 
growth opportunities into target stock price, thus the managers are likely to pay less 
premium.  I also include TargetSize, the log of target firm revenue; TargetLev, the target 
firm leverage; and TargetROE, the target firm return on equity.  I also control for deal 
characteristics using four indicator variables: CompeteBid, equal to one if there are 
competing bids, zero otherwise; MAStrategy, equal to one if the acquirer firm and target 
firm operate in the same two-digit SIC industry, zero otherwise; StockPmt, equal to one if 
the deal is paid either partially or fully by stock, zero otherwise; and Tender, equal to one 
if the deal is a tender offer, zero otherwise.  If the deal has a competing bid, is paid by all 
cash, or is a tender offer, then the acquirers are more likely to pay a high premium.  
Industry and year fixed effects are also included to control for differences in acquisition 
premiums paid across industries and any time-series trend in M&A purchase price. 
Under H3, if traditional and online display lead to higher premiums, then I predict 




4. SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 Panel A presents the sample selection.  The population is all completed 
M&As for which the targets have pre-M&A Kantar data, and both targets and acquirers 
are US public firms during the period from 2011–2018.  This yields 264 acquisitions.  
Then I manually collect purchase price allocation and valuation process information from 
the acquirers’ SEC filings; 19 observations lacking available purchase price allocation 
disclosures are dropped.13  I remove another 35 observations with missing variable 
values, resulting in a final sample of 210 M&As.  Panel B reports the sample distribution 
by acquirer choice of brand recognition and brand amortization.  Of the 210 transactions, 
target brand intangible assets are recognized in 105 deals.  Among those deals for which 
the brand asset’s amortization schedules are disclosed (102 out of 105), 20% have an 
expected useful life of less than or equal to five years, 22% of 6–10 years, 16% of 11–38 
years, and 39% recognize an indefinite useful life.  Panel C shows the distribution by 
target and acquirer industry.  Of the 210 deals, 32% (27%) [37%-45%] of firms (target or 
acquirer) operate in the manufacturing (financial) [service] industry. 
<Table 1> 
Table 2 reports advertising and brand statistics by year for M&A sample firms 
(Panel A) and advertising statistics for whole Kantar sample public firms (Panel B).  Of 
the 210 deals having Kantar target advertising data, only half (113) firms report total 
                                                        
13  This is because (i) the acquirer reports only an aggregated purchase price allocation from 
multiple M&As, (ii) only the total intangible asset value without specific breakdowns is 
presented in the SEC filings, or (iii) the deal is a recent M&A for which the purchase price 
allocation is not yet available.   
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advertising expenditures in Compustat, with an average of $46.3 million.  The advertising 
(in Compustat and Kantar) amount is unusually high in year 2015, because Time Warner, 
who reports $2586 million advertising expense in Compustat and spends $10, $20, and 
$1020 million in PaidSearch, OnlineDisplay, and Traditional, is acquired by AT&T in 
year 2016.14  Moving to brand characteristics, the percentage of deals with recognized 
brand assets ranges from 23% to 86%.  The average useful life for the brand asset ranges 
from 5 to 15 years (treating indefinite as 30 years, and no recognized brand as 0 year).  
Panel B shows that on average less than half (around 800 out of 1,800) of Kantar firms 
disclose advertising expenditures in Compustat.  For firms that have advertising data in 
Kantar and report non-missing advertising expense in Compustat, their average reported 
advertising expenditure is around $90 million per year.  The average total advertising 
media expenditure of public firms tracked by Kantar is around $30 million per year.15  
For the whole Kantar sample, only PaidSearch has an increasing trend while 
OnlineDisplay and Traditional remains relatively same over time. 
<Table 2> 
Table 3 presents some sample M&A firms’ advertising and brand characteristics.  
Brand intangible asset recognition occurs in M&A deals across a wide range of industries 
(tobacco, technology, pharmaceuticals, retail etc.).  There is also substantial 
                                                        
14		Main results are not affected by excluding this observation. 
15		The difference between Kantar and Compustat advertising expenditure likely reflects several 
reasons: (i) Compusat uses firm’s self-reported advertising expense, which may have varying 
definitions by different firms—for example, some firms include sales and marketing personnel 
wage in advertising expense; and (ii) the Kantar database used in these analyses does not 
include mobile ads or social media ads.  	
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heterogeneity in the recognized brand value as well as amortization treatment of the 
brand. 
<Table 3> 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics.  On average sample target firms spend 
0.44% of total sales on media advertising, broken down as 0.28% (0.093%) [0.064%] on 
traditional (online display) [paid search] advertising; similar percentages occur using total 
assets as the scalar.  Summary statistics for the other control variables are comparable to 
prior research (e.g., Bahadir et al. 2008).   
<Table 4> 
The valuation process information, hand-collected from SEC filings around each 
acquisition, also is presented in Table 4.  ValuationAdj_AbsAmt is the absolute difference 
between the initially assigned brand value and the final value, deflated by final brand 
value: it averages 40% of final value, indicating significant changes in brand value during 
the valuation process.  ValuationAdj_Days is the number of days after M&A completion 
date when the acquirer first discloses the initial value of brand intangible assets: the 
median value is 35 days.16  Appraisal is an indicator variable equal to one if acquirer 
firms disclose that they hire independent valuation experts in helping with the intangible 
asset valuation process, and zero otherwise: only 18% of firms disclose using a valuation 
expert.  Valuation_Table is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer firm 
discloses each category of intangible assets in a table, and zero if only in text: 81% use 
                                                        
16  A negative number indicates that the acquirer firm discloses an estimated brand intangible 
asset number before completing the acquisition.   
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tabular presentation.  Valuation_Disc is a categorical variable equal to: 1 if the acquirer 
firm discloses neither specific method nor major assumptions in valuing brand asset; 2 if 
disclosing a specific method (e.g., RFR) in valuing brand asset; 3 if disclosing major 
assumptions when valuing the brand; and 4 if disclosing both the specific method and 
major assumptions when doing brand asset valuation.  25% of the sample firms do not 
disclose the valuation method or assumptions used during the valuation process.  
Collectively, these descriptive data indicate substantial variation in management 
reporting choices surrounding the brand intangible asset and its valuation.  
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix.  Traditional and OnlineDisplay are 
positively correlated with BrandRecognition, BrandValue, and AmortIndef, consistent 
with H1 and H2a.  There is also a positive correlation between Traditional and 
AmortLife, consistent with H2b.  There is no significant correlation between advertising 
variables and Premium variables.   Correlations between all variables suggest no 
substantial multi-collinearity concerns; additional untabulated tests (using variance 
inflation factors) similarly suggest no multi-collinearity. 
<Table 5> 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1  The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Brand Recognition 
Table 6 presents the logistic regression results of Equation (1).  Column (1) 
reports the results using disaggregated advertising deflated by target firm sales.  The 
coefficients of Traditional (0.12; p-value = 0.06) and OnlineDisplay (0.18; p-value = 
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0.00) are significantly positive as expected.  To provide the economic effect; an increase 
of 0.1% of advertising on Traditional (OnlineDisplay) as a percentage of sales lead to an 
increased probability of 12% (18%) on brand recognition.  The coefficient on PaidSearch 
is negative and not significant (–0.11; p-value = 0.30).17  The bottom of the table presents 
tests of coefficients; the difference between the coefficients on Traditional and 
PaidSearch, and on OnlineDisplay and PaidSearch, are both significantly positive as 
predicted (p-value = 0.048 and 0.029, respectively).  Column (2) presents the results, now 
summing traditional and online display deflated by target firm sales.  Similar to the above 
results, the coefficient of Traditional + OnlineDisplay is significantly positive (0.28; p-
value = 0.02), that on PaidSearch is negative (–0.09; p-value = 0.38), and the difference 
is significantly positive as predicted (p-value = 0.033).  These results provide support for 
H1.     
Column (3) redefines the Traditional, OnlineDisplay, and PaidSearch 
experimental variables by using an alternative scalar of total assets.  Results are similar to 
those reported above.  The coefficients of Traditional (0.26; p-value = 0.01), 
OnlineDisplay (0.22; p-value = 0.04), and Traditional+OnlineDisplay (0.47; p-value = 
0.03) remain significantly positive.  The coefficient on PaidSearch remains negative (-
0.10; p-value = 0.21).  Tests of coefficients reveal significant differences between 
Traditional and PaidSearch (p-value = 0.038), OnlineDisplay and PaidSearch (p-value = 
0.032), and Traditional + OnlineDisplay and PaidSearch (p-value = 0.024).     
                                                        
17  PaidSearch is used primarily for generating immediate sales, which may hurt future sales and 
thus negatively affect brand recognition. 
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Turning to the control variables, TargetIndCompetition, MAStrategy, and 
TargetFirmage is positively associated with the likelihood of brand asset recognition (p-
value < 0.1 across all columns), suggesting that brand asset is perceived to be more 
important in more competitive industries, in synergetic M&A deals, and for older target 
firms.  The remaining control variables are generally insignificant.  Collectively, the 
results in Table 6 provide strong evidence that the likelihood of recognizing a brand 
intangible asset upon acquisition is higher for those target firms having traditional and 
online display advertising, as compared with paid search advertising; this provides 
evidence consistent with H1. 
<Table 6> 
 
5.2  The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Brand Asset Valuation and 
Amortization 
Table 7 presents the Equation (2) results examining the effects of advertising 
expenditures on brand asset valuation (i.e., H2a).  Focusing on Columns (1) and (2), 
where BrandValue is defined using advertising variables deflated by target sales, the 
coefficient on Traditional is significantly positive as expected (0.04, p-value = 0.04), as 
is that for OnlineDisplay (0.07, p-value = 0.09).  The coefficient on Traditional + 
OnlineDisplay is also significant (0.08, p-value = 0.00).  To provide the economic effect; 
an increase of 0.1% of advertising on Traditional (OnlineDisplay) as a percentage of 
sales lead to an increased valuation of $2.5 million ($5 million) on brand .  The 
coefficients on PaidSearch are not significant (–0.02 and 0.01, p-value = 0.72 and 0.99, 
respectively).  The differences tabulated at the bottom of the table reveal the coefficients 
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on Traditional (p-value = 0.074), OnlineDisplay (p-value = 0.093), and Traditional + 
OnlineDisplay (p-value = 0.048 to all be larger than that on PaidSearch as expected.  
This supports H2a: target firms’ spending on traditional and online display advertising 
have a more positive effect on the intangible brand value recognized by the acquirer firms 
relative to paid search advertising.  These effects are further supported in Column (3) and 
(4), in which advertising deflated by target total assets are adopted as independent 
variables. 
Of the control variables, the target firm’s market share (TargetMktShare), 
industry competition (TargetIndCompetition), importance of brand in acquirer 
(AcqBrandMention), and acquirer size (AcqSize) are consistently positive and significant.  
If the target firm possesses a higher market share among competitors or operates in a 
more competitive industry, this is suggestive of the target firm having a strong brand, 
which would lead upon acquisition to recognition of a higher brand value.  If the acquirer 
firm values and mentions more brand or is larger, it has a higher tendency to value target 
firm’s brand asset.  The remaining control variables are either insignificant or not 
consistently significant.  
<Table 7> 
Table 8 presents results from Equation (4) examining the effects of advertising 
expenditures on brand amortization (i.e., H2b).  Panels A and B present evidence using 
AmortIndef and AmortLife as dependent variables, respectively.  Results in Columns (1), 
(2) and (5), (6) use advertising variables scaled by target sales; those in Columns (3), (4) 
and (7), (8) deflate by target total assets.  Traditional in general exhibits a positive and 
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significant association with both the likelihood of indefinite amortization (0.06 and 0.13, 
p-value = 0.05 and 0.09), as well as the number of years in expected useful life (0.71 and 
0.51, p-value = 0.03 and 0.08).  More importantly, the bottom of the table confirms that 
the coefficient on Traditional is more positive relative to that on PaidSearch in all 
Columns (p-value = 0.081, 0.095, 0.058, and 0.073).  Turning to OnlineDisplay, the 
coefficient is significant in Column (1), (3), and (7), and is insignificant in either Column 
(5).  The coefficients on PaidSearch are insignificant in all columns (–0.14, p-value = 
0.28; –0.04, p-value = 0.60; –0.48, p-value = 0.31; –0.19, p-value = 0.34); this suggests a 
negative association between paid search advertising and the useful life of brand assets.  
More importantly, the coefficient on OnlineDisplay is significantly more positive relative 
to PaidSearch for either indefinite amortization (p-value = 0.092 and 0.077) or 
amortization life (p-value = 0.146 and 0.085).  The coefficient on Traditional + 
OnlineDisplay is also significant (0.07, p-value = 0.02; 0.04, p-value = 0.02; 0.72, p-
value = 0.02; 0.62, p-value = 0.02;), and is more positive than the coefficients of 
PaidSearch for indefinite amortization (p-value = 0.078 and 0.071).  These provide 
support for H2b. 
Among the control variables importance of brand for acquirer 
(AcqBrandMention), and age of target (TargetFirmAge) are consistently positive and 
significant.  A target with older age is likely cumulate advertising and reputation 
overtime, suggestive of a strong brand, which would not only lead to recognition of a 
higher brand value, but also a longer expected useful life.  The more the acquirer value 
brand, the higher expected useful life of brand.  The remaining control variables are 
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either insignificant or not consistently significant.  
<Table 8> 
Overall, the results of Tables 7 and 8 support H2a and H2b.  In particular, target 
firms’ traditional and online display advertising appear to have a stronger mapping into 
both the brand value that is recognized by the acquirer, as well as the likelihood of 
reporting an indefinite brand life, as well as the number of years of useful life, as 
compared to paid search advertising.   
 
5.3  The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Acquisition Premium 
Table 9 presents results of Equation (5) examining the impact of advertising 
expenditures on deal premium (i.e., H3).  Panels A and B present evidence using 
Premium_Ann and Premium_1Mon as dependent variables, respectively.  Results in 
Columns (1) and (3) use advertising variables scaled by target sales; and those in 
Columns (2) and (4) use advertising variables scaled by target total assets.  The 
coefficient on Traditional is consistently significantly positive with both acquisition date 
premium (0.44, p-value = 0.00 and 0.51, p-value = 0.00) and that one-month before the 
acquisition date (0.48, p-value = 0.00 and 0.57, p-value = 0.00).  Interestingly, both 
digital advertising type of OnlineDisplay and PaidSearch appear negatively associated 
with the acquisition premium.  One possible explanation is that investors already 
incorporate such information into their contemporaneous stock price, so managers would 
pay less premium for online display.18  Another is that the primary benefits of long-term 
                                                        
18   Untabulated results show that sample target firm 12-month buy and hold abnormal return is 




brand-building accumulate through traditional advertising channels and not through 
digital advertising channels; and that these benefits are revealed to acquirers in their due 
diligence, leading to higher acquisition premiums.  
Turning to the control variables, StockPmt is negatively associated with premium, 
consistent with stock payment regarded as a negative signal of the quality of the acquirer 
stock (Myers and Majluf 1984).  Moreover, Tender is significantly positive, suggesting 
target management’s willingness to be acquired resulting in a higher premium.  The 
remaining control variables are insignificant.  
<Table 9> 
 
6. SENSITIVITY AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
6.1  Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, I examine the robustness of my findings.  First, as BrandValue is 
the log value of recognized brand asset, the significant association between BrandValue 
and advertising expenditures may reflect firm size (although both firm size and market 
share are included as control variables).  Accordingly, I use two alternative definitions of 
brand value: (a) recognized brand value deflated by target firm total assets, and (b) 
recognized brand value deflated by total purchase price consideration for the M&A.  The 
inferences are unchanged using these alternative dependent variables. 
Second, although the Kantar data is employed by many prior studies (e.g., Reuter 
and Zitzewitz 2006; Clark et al. 2009), there may be concerns about measurement error in 
                                                        
before M&A announcement, suggesting the contemporaneous incorporation of paid search and 
online display by investors. 
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the media advertising expenditures.  Accordingly, I redefine the measurement window 
for the advertising data (measured as the average of the two-years preceding the 
acquisition date) to alternatively be: (i) the average of all available years; (ii) the average 
of the three years preceding the acquisition date; and (iii) only the most recent one year 
preceding the acquisition data.  The results are robust across all of to these alternative 
experimental variable definitions. 
Third, 27% of my sample observations are M&As in the financial industry (SIC 
6000-6900).  As the asset base for such firms differ significantly from those of non-
financial firms, and because the incentives to recognize intangible assets such as brands 
may differ (due to banking regulatory reporting requirements that typically exclude 
intangible assets from key ratio calculations), I also test my results excluding sample 
firms in the financial industry.  I obtain qualitatively similar results. 
Finally, I include additional control variables for target firm characteristics, 
including target total advertising expenditure reported in Compustat.  I also adopt 
alternative definitions of firm size such as total sales and number of employees, and 
alternative industry fixed effects of Fama-French 10 industry fixed effects.  All the 
inferences remain unchanged using these alternative model specifications and variable 
definitions.   
 
6.2  Endogeneity 
In this section, I address potential endogeneity within my setting.  First, since 
target firms are not randomly assigned, there can lead to selection bias.  For example, 
target firms may have advertising that is more effective in creating intangible brand 
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assets and increasing brand asset value relative to similar non-target firms (Capron and 
Shen 2007).  Accordingly, I conduct an additional Heckman (1979) two-step estimation 
procedure.  First, I estimate a selection model of the target: for each target firm, I match a 
firm from the same 4-digit SIC industry and of similar size (Total Assets) and advertising 
expenditures.  The target and matched firms are then pooled in a first-stage model of the 
likelihood of acquisition; the second stage of brand asset recognition then includes the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMRTgt).  The coefficient for IMRTgt in the brand recognition model 
therefore captures systematic differences between target and non-target firms on brand 
recognition.  Moreover, the main analyses of brand valuation (Table 7) use a Heckman 
selection model to control for systematic differences between firms with and without 
recognized brand intangibles.  To address issues in both target selection and brand 
recognition and allowing the error terms across the two selection equations to be 
correlated, a three-stage least square procedure is adopted (Zellner 1962; Wooldridge 
2010).  Table 10 Columns (1) to (4) presents the results controlling for target sample 
selection.  The coefficient of IMRTgt is insignificant across all the equations, providing 
some assurance of no selection bias from target firms.  The coefficients of OnlineDisplay 
and Traditional, controlling for target sample selection and brand recognition, remain 
significantly higher than those of PaidSearch, consistent with the main results in Table 6 
and Table 7.  
<Table 10> 
Second, prior research suggests potential endogeneity in advertising response 
models when the advertising variables correlate with the error terms.  In particular, 
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allocation of advertising is not random, suggesting a selection bias can occur when 
managers choose media channels which appeal more to the targeted group (Danaher and 
Dagger 2013).  For example, customers searching for a related keyword makes the 
customers more likely to be exposed to a search ad and more likely to purchase online 
(Blake et al. 2015).  If customers exposed to online display and traditional advertising are 
more likely to value brand image than customers exposed to paid search, there exists a 
correlated omitted variable concern.19   Accordingly, I create instrumental variables (IVs) 
for these media, and use the predicted values in Equations (2) and (3).  Previous studies 
use firms’ advertising from non-competing firms as instrumental variables (e.g., Ataman 
et al. 2010, Rinallo and Basuroy 2009, Dinner et al. 2014): I follow this approach, and 
use as IVs the advertising expenditures (traditional, online display, and paid search 
expenses) by similar but non-competing firms.  The corresponding logic is that shocks 
creating exogenous variations in advertising variables in one market will cause similar 
exogenous variations in the focal market.  Therefore, advertising from non-competing 
(but not too dissimilar) firms are subject to similar exogeneous shocks that sample target 
firms face but are unlikely to affect cumulative brand value of the focal firms and thus 
will not be correlated with the error terms.  The advertising expenditures of the firms 
having the following traits are used: (1) the firm must be in the same 2-digit SIC but 
                                                        
19   Another endogeneity concern related to advertising is the demand shocks bias when managers 
anticipate high demand from consumers at certain time periods (e.g., Thanksgiving) and adjust 
their advertising accordingly (Petrin and Train 2010). Since brand intangibles represent the 
cumulative long-term effect of advertising, they are unlikely to be affected by temporal 
demand shocks. In addition, untabulated results show consistent advertising expenditures by 
sample targets before M&A announcement using monthly data. Therefore, the demand shock 




different 4-digit SIC with the target firm; (2) the firm has available advertising data from 
Kantar; and (3) the firm is of similar size as target firms in the sample.  I apply the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; results fail to reject the null hypothesis that OLS estimates of 
the structural equations are consistent (Rinallo and Suman 2009, Wooldridge 2002).20 21 
 
6.3  Additional Analyses – Consequences of Brand Assets 
Finally, I conduct two preliminary analyses to assess whether the recognition of 
brand intangible assets by managers of acquiring firms is consistent with this representing 
a long-term underlying economic asset.  First, I conduct a market test, and investigate the 
market reaction to acquirer firms’ recognized brand value around the date of the first 
public filings in which acquirers recognize brand assets.  Kallapur and Kwan (2004) finds 
a positive average stock market reaction to recognized brand amount, on a small sample 
of 24 M&As in the UK.  I reexamine this issue using my US sample (N=100) and a 
shorter-window of CAR (3-day) to better isolate the observed market response.   
I collect the brand asset amount disclosed in the first public filing after the M&A 
announcement by manually reading all public filings (including 8K, S4, 10Q, 10K) for 
the acquirer firm.  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated using the 3-day (-1, 
+1) value-weighted market-adjusted stock return of the acquirer firm, centered around the 
filing date of the first disclosure.  Results are reported in Table 11 Panel A.  Columns (1), 
                                                        
20   p = 0.785, 0.238, and 0.339 in the brand recognition equation and p = 0.220, 0.240, and 0.330 
in the brand value equation for Traditional, OnlineDisplay, and PaidSearch, respectively. 
21   In general, failure to reject the null implies that there is no need for structural modelling, but 
failure to reject the null may or may not imply the presence of endogeneity.  It is possible that 
endogeneity exists but the Hausman test fails to find it due to issues such as model 
specification, variable measurement, or sample size power. 
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(2), and (3) show the brand amount in log value, deflated by market value of equity, and 
deflated by deal purchase price, respectively.  Results reveal that Brand is positively 
associated with 3-day CAR across all three brand measures, suggesting positive investor 
reaction to recognized brand amount. 
<Table 11> 
Second, I examine whether acquired brand asset exhibit ex post future benefits.  
To proxy for future benefits associated with brand assets, I use future revenues.  My 
choice of revenue is consistent with the notion that brand assets lead to future sales 
generation.22  Thus, I estimate the following OLS model: 
AcqSalesi,t+n = α0 + b1BrandValuei,t + b2AcqLeveragei,t + b3AcqSizei,t + 
b4AcqFinancingi,t + b5AcqIndGrowthi,t + 
b6AcqIndCompetitioni,t + b7AcqIndDemandRiski,t + Year FE + 
ei,t                                 (6)  
The dependent variable is the log of acquirer firms’ total revenue one, two, or 
three years after the completion date of the M&A.  The main variable of interest is 
BrandValue, which is the log value of intangible brand asset, or equal to zero if no brand 
asset is recognized.  If the brand intangible asset produces long-term benefits for acquirer 
firm, as suggested by the capitalization and recognition of the brand asset, then I predict a 
positive association between BrandValue and the acquirer firm future Sales.  Following 
Bayer et al. (2019), I control for acquirer leverage (AcqLeverage), acquirer size 
                                                        
22  Other measures, such as bottom-line constructs like net income, appear less compelling.  
Restated, brand assets appear more consistent with the notion of premium pricing (i.e., ability 




(AcqSize), acquirer financing (AcqFinancing), acquirer industry growth (AcqIndGrowth), 
acquirer industry competition (AcqIndCompetition), and acquirer industry demand risk 
(AcqIndDemandRisk). 
The results are presented in Table 11 Panel B.  Columns (1), (2), and (3) use 
acquirer firm sales for one, two, and three years after completion of the deal, respectively.  
BrandValue is significantly positive with future acquirer firm sales across all three 
periods: for year t+1 (0.08, p-value=0.01); years up to t+2 (0.11, p-value=0.01); and years 
up to t+3 (0.21, p-value=0.00).  This suggests that brand intangible assets do produce 
long-term revenue for the acquirer firms, and provides ex post validation of the 
capitalization decision made by acquiring firms.  For the control variables, acquirer size, 




This paper examines how the alternative advertising channels (paid search, online 
display, and traditional) affect the financial reporting treatment of brand asset 
recognition.  The analyses are motivated, in part, by the dramatic shift in advertising 
expenditures in recent years away from traditional channels (such as television) towards 
digital channels (including both online display and paid search).  I exploit differences in 
the characteristics of these advertising types to assess their impacts on both the 
recognition of, as well as the characteristics of, brand assets.  To assess the recognition of 
this intangible asset, I use the setting of M&A, which provides a unique setting in which 
	
40 
to observe reported brand assets.  To derive the advertising channels, I use a unique 
dataset of annual advertising spending in different media outlets, assessed over the period 
2011-2016.  Of note, this dataset allows for decomposed advertising expenditures into 
their primary components; prior research either suffers from missing advertising data, or 
only has aggregated advertising expenses.  Consistent with expectations, I find that target 
firms’ spending on traditional and online display advertising exhibits a larger effect on 
the likelihood of separate brand asset recognition, a more positive impact on any 
recognized brand asset value, and a larger effect on reported useful life of this brand 
asset, relative to paid search advertising expenditures.  Overall, these results confirm 
expected heterogeneous effects of different advertising channels on the recognition and 




Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Brand Variables Definition 
BrandRecognition Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer firm recognizes an 
intangible brand asset, zero otherwise  
BrandValue Log of brand intangible asset value as reported by the acquirer 
firm, zero if no brand intangible asset is recognized 
Amort_Indef Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer firm recognizes an 
indefinite useful life associated with the brand asset, zero 
otherwise  
Amort_Life Number of years of expected useful life for the brand asset, 30 
if indefinite 
Advertising Variables  
PaidSearch Target’s paid search advertising divided by beginning of the 
year target firm sales (or total assets), averaged over two years 
preceding the M&A announcements; if two years of data are 
unavailable, the one-year paid search advertising in the year 
preceding acquisition divided by sales (or total assets) is used 
OnlineDisplay Target’s online display advertising divided by beginning of the 
year target firm sales (or total assets), averaged over two years 
preceding the M&A announcements; if two years of data are 
unavailable, the one-year online display advertising in the year 
preceding acquisition divided by sales (or total assets) is used 
Traditional Target’s traditional advertising divided by beginning of the year 
target firm sales (or total assets), averaged over two years 
preceding the M&A announcements; if two years of data are 
unavailable, the one-year traditional advertising in the year 
preceding acquisition divided by sales (or total assets) is used 
Control Variables  
AcqLeverage Acquirer’s long-term debt/total assets 
AcqFinancing Acquirer’s short-term debt/total assets 
AcqTechnology Acquirer’s R&D expenditures/total revenue 
AcqSize Acquirer’s logged total assets 
AcqBrandMention Log of the number of times acquirer mention “brand”, 
“trademark”, or “tradename” in the most recent 10K preceding 
M&A announcement 
TargetAcqSize Target firm total assets deflated by acquirer firm total assets 
TargetFirmage Log of the number of years target firm data exists in Compustat 
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TargetBTM Target firm book value deflated by market value 
TargetLeverage Target’s long-term debt/total assets 
TargetROE Target’s net income/book value of equity 
TargetSize Target logged total revenue 
TargetMktShare Target firm sales/total sales of four-digit SIC code, averaged 
over three years before M&A 
TargetSalesGrowth Target firm average of three-period year-over-year sales growth 
TargetIndGrowth The average of three-period year-over-year sales growth in the 
target firm’s primary four-digit SIC code 
TargetIndDemandRisk Volatility of sales in the target firm’s primary four-digit SIC 
code 
TargetIndCompetition The sum of top three market shares in target firm’s primary 
four-digit SIC code 
Deal Variables  
Premium_Ann M&A announcement date acquisition premium, deflated by the 
target firm market value 
Premium_1Mon One month prior to M&A announcement date acquisition 
premium, deflated by the target firm market value 
CompeteBid Indicator variable equal to one if there is a competing bid for 
the deal, otherwise zero 
M&AStrategy Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer and target operate in 
same two-digit SIC industry, otherwise zero 
StockPmt Indicator variable equal to one if the deal is paid partially or 
fully by acquirer stock, otherwise zero 





BrandInitial/MV Brand intangible asset value initially disclosed by acquirer firm 
in public filings, deflated by market value of equity 
BrandInitial/PP Brand intangible asset value initially disclosed by acquirer firm 
in public filings, deflated by purchase price of the deal 
CAR 3-day CAR of the acquirer around the date of the first public 
filing in which acquirer recognizes brand intangible asset 
AcqSales(t+n) Log of acquirer total revenue n years after completion of M&A 
deal 
Valuation Variables  
ValuationAdj_AbsAmt Absolute value of the difference between initially assigned 
brand value and final value, deflated by final brand value 
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ValuationAdj_Days The number of days after M&A completion date when acquirer 
firm discloses for the first time in public filings, the initial value 
of brand intangible assets 
Appraisal Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer firm discloses the 
existence of independent valuation expert in assisting intangible 
asset valuation process in public filing, zero otherwise  
Valuation_Table Indicator variable equal to one if acquirer firm discloses the 
categories of intangible assets in a table, zero otherwise  
Valuation_Disc Categorical variable equal to: 1 if acquirer firm discloses 
neither specific method nor major assumptions in valuing brand 
asset; 2 if acquirer firm only discloses specific method (e.g., 
RFRM) in valuing brand asset; 3 if acquirer firm only discloses 
major assumptions when valuing brand; and otherwise 4 if 
acquirer firm discloses both specific method and major 






Table 1. Sample Selection and Composition 
  
Panel A: Sample Selection Observations 
  
M&A deals with available target advertising data in Kantar 264 
Drop:  
     observations without purchase price allocation disclosure (19) 
     observations without necessary control variables (35) 
  
Final Sample 210 
  
Panel B: Distribution by Brand Recognition and Amortization 
  
No brand recognition 105 
With brand recognition:   105 
     Missing Amortization 3 
     Amortization (  0–5 years) 21 
     Amortization (  6–10 years) 23 
     Amortization (11–38 years) 17 
     Amortization (Indefinite) 41 
Total Sample 210 
      
Panel C: Distribution by Target and Acquirer Industry 
     
Target   Acquirer  
  Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 12 5.7 5.7 
 
11 5.2 5.2 
Manufacturing 67 31.9 37.6 
 
71 33.8 37.6 
Transportation & Public Utilities 20 9.5 47.1 
 
24 11.4 50.5 
Wholesale and Retail 9 4.3 51.4 
 
9 4.3 54.8 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 57 27.1 78.6 
 
55 26.2 80.9 
Services 45 21.4 100.0 
 
37 17.6 98.6 
Public Administration 0 0.0 100.0 
 
3 1.6 100.0 
Total 210 100.0     210 100.0   
 
Panel A presents the sample selection.  Panel B presents the distribution by brand 
recognition and reported amortization schedules.  Panel C presents the industry 





Table 2. Advertising Statistics 
 
Panel A. Advertising and Brand Statistics by Year – Merger and Acquisition Sample (N = 210) 
 
Year CompustatAdv KantarAdv BrandRecognition BrandValue BrandAmort N(CompAdv) N(KantarAdv) 
 ($ millions) ($ millions) (%Percentage) ($ millions) (#years) (if nonmissing)  
2010  4.0   0.09   0.33   5.7   4.7  2 6 
2011  3.5   0.17   0.86   19.1   15.7  3 7 
2012  1.4   0.24   0.23   2.9   5.0  8 13 
2013  10.2   4.18   0.45   1,296.9   5.6  15 22 
2014  33.3   7.98   0.47   458.4   8.5  15 22 
2015  107.0   24.10   0.57   451.5   9.7  30 57 
2016  36.3   11.21   0.52   233.3   9.3  26 54 
Average  46.3   11.36   0.50   430.9   8.7  113 210 
 
Panel B. Advertising Statistics by Year – Whole Kantar Public Firm Sample 
 
Year CompustatAdv KantarAdv PaidSearch OnlineDisplay Traditional N(CompAdv) N(KantarAdv) 
   ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) (if nonmissing)  
2010  78.8  32.85 1.92 2.80 28.14 761 1,651 
2011  87.2  30.57 1.67 2.99 25.91 831 1,753 
2012  90.3  29.07 1.36 2.68 25.03 901 1,825 
2013  93.4  28.80 1.25 3.02 24.54 928 1,866 
2014  87.7  27.92 1.74 2.68 23.50 942 1,907 
2015  93.0  27.15 1.98 2.32 22.85 872 1,799 
2016  96.7  29.29 2.54 2.33 24.43 820 1,718 
Average 89.6 29.39 1.78 2.70 24.92 865 1,788 
 
Panel A presents average advertising expenditures in millions of dollars per Compustat and Kantar and brand characteristics 
for the M&A sample by year.  Panel B presents the whole Kantar sample average advertising expenditures in Compustat and 























Lorillard LLC 61,094 97 0 Reynolds American Inc 7/15/2014 27,203 indefinite 
Time Warner Inc 1020,489 20,360 10,126 AT&T Inc 10/22/2016 18,081 38 
Jarden Corp 19,143 3,719 0 Newell Brands Inc 12/14/2015 8,624 indefinite 
Express Scripts Holding 
Co 726 11 1,084 Cigna Corp 3/8/2018 8,515 indefinite 
Salix Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd 752 528 420 Bausch Health Cos Inc 2/22/2015 6,756 11 
Aetna Inc 13,130 717 6,438 CVS Health Corp 12/3/2017 4,165 indefinite 
Precision Castparts Corp 5 3 0 Berkshire Hathaway Inc 8/10/2015 2,300 indefinite 
LinkedIn Corp 39 2,575 1,278 Microsoft Corp 6/13/2016 2,148 20 
Snyder's-Lance Inc 12,446 1,237 149 Campbell Soup Co 12/18/2017 2,131 indefinite 
Whole Foods Market Inc 12,027 1,227 0 Amazon.com Inc 6/16/2017 1,928 25 
Rockwell Collins Inc 68 26 0 United Technologies Corp 9/5/2017 1,870 indefinite 
Pall Corp 4 10 0 Danaher Corp 5/13/2015 1,330 indefinite 
Kate Spade & Co LLC 9,490 367 2,888 Tapestry Inc 5/8/2017 1,300 indefinite 
Cameron International 
Corp 13 0 0 Schlumberger Ltd 8/26/2015 1,225 25 
Scripps Networks 
Interactive 13,597 1,050 4,358 Discovery Inc 7/31/2017 1,225 10 
OpenTable Inc 4 19 229 Booking Holdings Inc 6/13/2014 1,100 20 
This table displays select M&A sample observations, based on the sixteen largest brand assets recognized in the acquisition.  
Traditional, Online Display, and Paid Search are the target firm’s annual advertising expenditures (in thousands) in the year 
preceding the M&A announcement.  Brand Value is the acquirer’s brand intangible assets amount (in millions) recognized on 
the acquirer balance sheet.  Brand Amort is the number of years of reported expected useful life for the brand asset. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N P25 Mean Median P75 SD 
Brand Variables 
  BrandRecognition 210 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 
  BrandValue 210 0.00 2.06 0.02 3.89 2.62 
  Amort_Indef 207 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.40 
  Amort_Life 207 0.00 8.66 0.00 17.00 11.95 
Advertising Variables   
Advertising Deflated by Sales      
  PaidSearch 210 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.01 2.65 
  OnlineDisplay 210 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.16 3.87 
  Traditional 210 0.00 2.81 0.02 0.83 10.03 
Advertising Deflated by Assets      
  PaidSearch 210 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 4.51 
  OnlineDisplay 210 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.08 2.79 
  Traditional 210 0.00 2.70 0.01 0.17 12.75 
Control Variables 
      
  AcqLeverage 210 0.18 2.03 0.54 1.08 8.25 
  AcqFinancing 210 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.07 
  AcqTechnology 210 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.08 
  AcqSize 210 7.62 8.63 8.60 9.65 1.88 
  AcqIndGrowth 157 0.18 1.80 0.38 0.83 6.29 
  AcqIndCompetition 157 0.26 0.52 0.48 0.74 0.27 
  AcqBrandMention 210  1.10   2.25   2.52   3.33   1.52  
  AcqIndDemandRisk 157 2,947 11,792 8,375 12,969 16,032 
  TargetMktShare 210 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.10 
  TargetSalesGrowth 210 -0.04 0.29 0.15 0.42 0.74 
  TargetIndGrowth 210 0.13 6.32 0.28 1.22 39.83 
  TargetIndDemandRisk 210 1,640 8,846 5,155 11,628 14,138 
  TargetIndCompetition 210 0.34 0.52 0.51 0.71 0.25 
  TargetBTM 210 0.65 2.46 1.05 3.48 2.88 
  TargetSize 210 4.91 6.24 6.19 7.35 1.73 
  TargetLev 210 0.00 0.47 0.35 0.91 2.84 
  TargetROE 210 -0.03 0.16 0.06 0.13 2.64 
  TargetAcqSize 210 0.10 0.63 0.30 0.64 1.26 
  TargetFirmage 210 2.30 2.87 2.89 3.26 0.65 
  MAStrategy 210 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Deal Variables 
      
  Premium_1Mon 210 13.70 29.21 26.45 40.05 26.44 
  Premium_Ann 210 14.39 28.90 26.63 40.61 23.19 
  Competebid 210 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
  Same_ind 210 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.50 
  Stockpmt 210 0.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 0.49 
  Tender 210 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.41 
Consequence Variables        
  BrandInitial/MV 100 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.23 
  BrandInitial/PP 100 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.15 
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 Acq Sales(t+1) 157 6.55 7.99 8.05 9.41 1.92 
 AcqSales(t+2) 100 6.53 8.03 7.98 9.41 1.93 
 AcqSales(t+3) 48 6.52 7.86 8.22 9.45 1.96 
 CAR 100 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.05 
Valuation Variables       
 ValuationAdj_AbsAmt 89 0.00 0.40 0.12 0.47 0.74 
 ValuationAdj_Days 89 -86.00 0.54 35.00 81.00 132.29 
 Appraisal 89 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.39 
 Valuation_Table 89 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.40 
 Valuation_Disc 89 1.00 2.39 2.00 4.00 1.23 
   
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables.  The values of all continuous 














       
Advertising deflated by Sales   
   PaidSearch 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 
   OnlineDisplay 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.17 -0.15 -0.06 
   Traditional 0.16 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.01 0.01 
       
Advertising deflated by Assets   
   PaidSearch 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
   OnlineDisplay 0.18 0.16 0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 
   Traditional 0.19 0.28 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.01 
 
This table provides the Pearson correlations between major variables used in the regression analysis.  Bolded numbers indicate 
significance at 10% level. 
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Dependent Variable = BrandRecognition 
Advertising  
Scaled by Sales 
Advertising  
Scaled by Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Traditional + 0.12*  0.26***  
  (0.06)  (0.01)  
OnlineDisplay + 0.18***  0.22**  
  (0.00)  (0.04)  
Traditional + OnlineDisplay +  0.28**  0.47*** 
   (0.02)  (0.01) 
PaidSearch ? -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 
  (0.30) (0.38) (0.21) (0.22) 
MAStrategy + 0.87** 0.87** 0.83** 0.83** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
TargetFirmage + 0.54* 0.54* 0.54* 0.54* 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
TargetIndGrowth + -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) 
TargetSalesGrowth + 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.23 
  (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) 
TargetMktShare + 3.78 3.75 3.74 3.80 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) 
TargetIndCompetition + 5.40*** 5.37*** 5.33*** 5.32*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TargetIndDemandRisk + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.35) (0.35) 
AcqBrandMention + 0.38** 0.38** 0.35** 0.35* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
AcqLeverage + -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.65) (0.65) (0.76) (0.77) 
AcqFinancing + 0.18 0.13 -0.17 -0.21 
  (0.48) (0.49) (0.97) (0.96) 
AcqSize + -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) 
Intercept  -5.76*** -5.76*** -5.72*** -5.70*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  210 210 210 210 
Pseudo R2  0.435 0.435 0.438 0.438 
Test of Coefficients (H1) (p-values)     
   Traditional      = PaidSearch 0.048**  0.038**  
   OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.029**  0.032**  
   Traditional+OnlineDisplay = 
PaidSearch  0.033**  0.024** 
 
This table presents the logistic regression results of Equation (1), investigating the effect 
of advertising expenditure types on the recognition of brand assets for firms that are 
subsequently acquired.  The dependent variable is BrandRecognition, an indicator 
variable equal to one if the acquirer firm recognizes a separate brand intangible asset, and 
zero otherwise.  Year and industry fixed effects are included.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the acquirer firm level.  p-values are presented in parentheses.  ***, **, * 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, based on the indicated one-tailed 
or two-tailed tests of significance.   
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Table 7. The Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Brand Valuation 





Scaled by Sales 
Advertising  
Scaled by Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Traditional + 0.04**  0.07***  
  (0.04)  (0.01)  
OnlineDisplay + 0.07*  0.06*  
  (0.09)  (0.09)  
Traditional + 
OnlineDisplay + 
 0.08***  0.09*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
PaidSearch ? -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 
  (0.72) (0.99) (0.54) (0.80) 
MAStrategy + 0.39 0.44 0.54 0.62 
  (0.23) (0.20) (0.15) (0.12) 
TargetFirmage + 0.50 0.51 0.60* 0.60* 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) 
TargetIndGrowth + -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.30) (0.21) (0.44) (0.29) 
TargetSalesGrowth + 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.03 
  (0.41) (0.38) (0.49) (0.49) 
TargetMktShare + 4.06 4.28* 4.18* 4.48* 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
TargetIndCompetition + 5.54*** 5.49*** 5.45*** 5.48*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TargetIndDemandRisk + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) 
AcqBrandMention + 0.91*** 0.95*** 0.90*** 0.95*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AcqLeverage + -0.07* -0.06* -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) 
AcqFinancing + -2.50 -3.32 -2.45 -3.16 
  (0.55) (0.45) (0.58) (0.50) 
AcqSize + 0.37** 0.38*** 0.37** 0.39** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
IMRBrand  -3.40*** -3.45*** -2.55** -2.58*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Intercept  -4.26 -4.28 -6.06** -6.13** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) 
	
53 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  210 210 210 210 
Pseudo R2  0.181 0.182 0.180 0.180 
Test of Coefficients (H2a) (p-values)    
   Traditional = 
PaidSearch 
 0.074*  0.091*  
   OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.093*  0.086*  
   Traditional+OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.048**   0.042** 
 
This table presents the regression results of Equations (3), investigating the effect of 
advertising expenditure type on the amount of brand value.  The dependent variable is 
BrandValue, which is the log of brand intangible asset value.  Year and industry fixed 
effects are included.  Standard errors are clustered at the target firm level.  p-values are 
presented in parentheses.  ***,**,* represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 





Table 8. Impact of Advertising Expenditure Type on Brand Amortization 
    Panel A. Dependent Variable = Amort_Indef Panel B. Dependent Variable = Amort_Life 
 Pred 
Sign 
Advertising Scaled  
by Sales 
Advertising Scaled   
by Assets 
Advertising Scaled  
by Sales 
Advertising Scaled 
by Assets Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Traditional + 0.06**  0.03*  0.71**  0.51*  
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.08)  
OnlineDisplay + 0.07*  0.10*  0.41  0.76*  
  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.10)  
Traditional + 
OnlineDisplay + 
 0.07**  0.04**  0.72**  0.62** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
PaidSearch ? -0.14 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.48 0.29 -0.19 0.29 
  (0.28) (0.63) (0.60) (0.88) (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.25) 
MAStrategy + 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.05 5.05 5.71 3.35 3.89 
  (0.41) (0.38) (0.46) (0.46) (0.13) (0.11) (0.23) (0.20) 
TargetFirmage + 1.01*** 1.00*** 0.75* 0.71* 7.62** 7.74** 7.43** 7.48** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
TargetIndGrowth + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 
  (0.25) (0.29) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) 
TargetSalesGrowth + -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.61 0.81 1.94 2.11 
  (0.46) (0.50) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.39) (0.25) (0.23) 
TargetMktShare + 1.92 2.08 1.62 1.61 21.53 25.06 19.24 22.20 
  (0.27) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.21) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) 
TargetIndCompetition + 1.21 1.28 0.98 0.89 41.7*** 41.8*** 41.3*** 41.3*** 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TargetIndDemandRisk + 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 





AcqBrandMention + 1.04*** 1.09*** 0.95*** 1.00*** 6.88*** 7.42*** 6.88*** 7.44*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AcqLeverage + -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.24 -0.22 -0.31 -0.29 
  (0.69) (0.71) (0.83) (0.83) (0.46) (0.49) (0.31) (0.33) 
AcqFinancing + -5.85 -6.02 -6.77 -7.03 12.62 5.60 11.09 4.73 
  (0.25) (0.22) (0.16) (0.14) (0.37) (0.45) (0.39) (0.45) 
AcqSize + -0.06 -0.05 -0.20 -0.20 0.35 0.43 0.29 0.31 
  (0.75) (0.79) (0.18) (0.18) (0.40) (0.38) (0.42) (0.42) 
IMRBrand ? -3.03*** -2.97*** -0.39 -0.43 -25.1*** -25.2*** -38.1*** -38*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.45) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept  -3.88** -4.14** -3.94* -4.03* -35.84 -36.82 -14.27 -14.68 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.53) (0.52) 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Pseudo R2  0.404 0.403 0.387 0.380 0.159 0.157 0.165 0.163 
Test of Coefficients(H2b)(p-values)         
   Traditional = PaidSearch 0.081*  0.095*  0.058*  0.073*  
   OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.092*  0.077*  0.146  0.085*  
   Traditional+OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.078*  0.071*  0.168  0.167 
 
This table presents the regression results of Equation (4), investigating the effect of advertising expenditure type on the chosen 
amortization life for the brand asset for firms that are acquired.  The dependent variable for Panel A is AmortIndef, which is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer firm estimates an indefinite useful life of brand asset, and zero otherwise; the 
dependent variable for Panel B is AmortLife, which is the reported number of years of expected useful life for the brand 
intangible asset (set equal to 30 if designated as an indefinite life).  Year and industry fixed effects are included.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the target firm level.  p-values are presented in parentheses.  ***,**,* represent significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, based on the indicated one-tailed or two-tailed tests of significance.
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Panel A: Panel B: 
DV = Premium_Ann DV = Premium_1Mon 
Sales Assets Sales Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Traditional + 0.44*** 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.57*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OnlineDisplay + -0.83*** -1.97*** -0.96*** -2.04*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PaidSearch ? -1.15** -0.67* -1.17* -0.77 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) 
TargetAcqSize - -4.19*** -4.22*** -2.04* -2.05* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.09) 
TargetBTM - -0.83 -0.78 0.05 0.11 
  (0.26) (0.29) (0.96) (0.90) 
TargetSize + -0.36 -0.71 -0.26 -0.56 
  (0.72) (0.49) (0.82) (0.64) 
TargetLev - -0.77* -0.80* -1.23** -1.27** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
TargetROE + -0.18 -0.14 0.02 0.06 
  (0.88) (0.91) (0.99) (0.97) 
CompeteBid + 19.81** 18.90** 16.36* 15.65* 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) 
MAStrategy ? -1.15 -0.67 -5.62 -5.17 
  (0.68) (0.81) (0.11) (0.13) 
StockPmt - -9.28*** -9.77*** -7.63* -8.20** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
Tender + 18.70*** 18.24*** 20.39*** 20.22*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept  55.68*** 61.64*** 55.27*** 60.03*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  210 210 210 210 
R2  0.333 0.323 0.275 0.267 
 
This table presents the regression results of Equation (5), investigating the effect of 
advertising expenditure type on M&A deal premium.  The dependent variable for Panel 
A is	Premium_Ann, which is the M&A announcement date acquisition premium as a 
percentage of the target firm’s pre-announcement market value; the dependent variable 
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for Panel B is Premium_1Mon, which is the 1 month before M&A announcement date 
acquisition premium as a percentage of the target firm’s pre-announcement market value.  
Year and industry fixed effects are included.  Standard errors are clustered at the target 
firm level.  p-values are presented in parentheses.  ***,**,* represent significance at the 







Table 10. Endogeneity 
 
    Panel A. Dependent Variable = BrandRecognition 











by Assets Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Traditional + 0.12*  0.26***  0.07***  0.05**  
  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
OnlineDisplay + 0.17***  0.20*  0.06*  0.06  
  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.25)  
Traditional + 
OnlineDisplay + 
 0.27**  0.45***  0.09***  0.08*** 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
PaidSearch ? -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
  (0.32) (0.40) (0.22) (0.23) (0.56) (0.82) (0.74) (0.94) 
MAStrategy + 0.90** 0.90** 0.86** 0.87** 0.57 0.63 0.42 0.46 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.12) (0.21) (0.20) 
TargetFirmage + 0.57** 0.57** 0.57** 0.57** 0.61* 0.60* 0.51 0.52 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
TargetIndGrowth + -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.38) (0.39) (0.42) (0.39) (0.46) (0.30) (0.32) (0.21) 
TargetSalesGrowth + 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.11 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.49) (0.47) (0.42) (0.38) 
TargetMktShare + 3.84 3.82 3.78 3.85 4.09* 4.45* 3.95 4.23* 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
TargetIndCompetition + 5.41*** 5.39*** 5.37*** 5.36*** 5.45*** 5.48*** 5.52*** 5.49*** 





TargetIndDemandRisk + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.32) (0.32) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) 
AcqBrandMention + 0.37** 0.38** 0.34** 0.34** 0.90*** 0.95*** 0.90*** 0.95*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AcqLeverage + -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06* -0.06* 
  (0.73) (0.73) (0.86) (0.87) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
AcqFinancing + 0.23 0.17 -0.11 -0.15 -2.26 -3.10 -2.26 -3.20 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.98) (0.97) (0.61) (0.51) (0.59) (0.47) 
AcqSize + -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 0.38** 0.39** 0.37** 0.38*** 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.17) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
IMRBrand ?     -2.57** -2.59*** -3.45*** -3.48*** 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
IMRTgt ? 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.24 0.09 0.30 0.16 
  (0.54) (0.52) (0.48) (0.49) (0.72) (0.88) (0.65) (0.80) 
Intercept  -6.06*** -6.07*** -6.09*** -6.06*** -6.21** -6.19** -4.40 -4.38 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.15) 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Pseudo R2  0.437 0.437 0.440 0.440 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.182 
Test of Coefficients(H2a)(p-
values) 
        
   Traditional = PaidSearch 0.051*  0.017**  0.077*  0.090*  
   OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.035**  0.022**  0.095*  0.097*  
   Traditional+OnlineDisplay = PaidSearch 0.037**  0.013**  0.042**  0.038* 
 
This table presents results of the main tests controlling for potential selection bias of target firms.  Column (1) and (2) show the 
effect of advertising (deflated by total revenue and total asset, respectively) on brand asset recognition.  The dependent 





asset, and zero otherwise.  Panel B shows the effect of advertising (deflated by total revenue and total asset, respectively) on 
brand asset value.  The dependent variable is BrandValue, the log of brand intangible asset value.  Year fixed effects are 
included.  Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer firm level.  p-values are presented in parentheses.  ***,**,* represent 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, based on the indicated one-tailed or two-tailed tests of significance. 
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Table 11. Investor Reaction to Brand and Impact of Brand Assets on Future 
Revenue 
 




Dependent Variable = CAR 
Log(Brand) Brand/MV Brand/PP 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Brand + 0.0026** 0.0192** 0.0374** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Intercept  -0.0228*** -0.0140** -0.0150** 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
N  100 100 100 
Adj. R2   0.016 0.008 0.013 
     




AcqSales(t+1) AcqSales(t+2) AcqSales(t+3) 
(1) (2) (3) 
BrandValue + 0.08*** 0.11** 0.21*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
AcqLeverage ? 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  (0.40) (0.69) (0.91) 
AcqSize + 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.92*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AcqFinancing ? -0.90 -2.36 0.81 
  (0.46) (0.16) (0.58) 
AcqIndGrowth + 0.01* 0.02 0.01* 
  (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) 
AcqIndCompetition + 2.60*** 2.66*** 2.94*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AcqIndDemandRisk ? 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
  (0.07) (0.15) (0.99) 
Intercept  -0.84* -0.86 -1.47 
  (0.08) (0.28) (0.38) 
Year FE  Y Y Y 
N  157 100 48 
Adj. R2   0.839 0.834 0.783 
This table presents additional analyses results of the consequence of recognized brand 
asset.  Panel A shows investor reaction to brand asset recognition.  The dependent 
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variable is the 3-day CAR of acquirer firm around the date of the first public filing in 
which acquirer firm recognizes brand asset.  Panel B shows the regression results of 
Equation (6), investigating the effect of brand intangible assets on acquirer firm future 
revenue.  The dependent variable is log of acquirer firm’s total revenue one/two/three 
years after completion of M&A deal.  Year fixed effects are included.  Standard errors 
are clustered at the acquirer firm level.  p-values are presented in parentheses.  ***,**,* 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, based on the indicated one-tailed 
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